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ENVIRONMENTAL LESSONS
Carol M. Rose*
Early in the modem history of environmentalism, James Krier and
Edmund Ursin wrote a very useful book called Pollution and Policy.'
Building on California's experience with air pollution control, the authors argued that environmental regulatory efforts involve a kind of
learning process. That is, legislators operate by collective trial and error,
enacting and then "exfoliating" one regulatory scheme after another, ideally using even the failures to learn more about the problems confronting
them.2
In these matters as in so many others, the country as a whole has
followed California's lead, learning in fits and starts about environmental
problems. But what have we learned in all the exfoliations since the first
Earth Day? Readers of this Symposium will no doubt observe that there
are almost too many answers to that question; quite a number, however,
fall into three major categories of problems. I call these, respectively, the
Information Problem, the Budget Problem, and the Priorities Problem.
Regarding the first, we have special difficulties in simply finding out
about environmental problems. As for the second, even when we do
have information, we have additional difficulties in adopting a systematic, cost-effective approach to budgeting on environmental issues. And
as for the third, even when we can budget for individual issues, we find
still other impediments to comparing and ranking environmental issues-impediments that prevent us from addressing these issues in an
orderly progression.
In the environmental area, learning, budgeting, and ranking are difficult tasks technically. But what is more daunting, as this Essay argues,
is that some of the most promising approaches to the technical problems
seem socially unattractive. All this should direct our attention to still
* Carol M. Rose is the Fred A. Johnston Professor of Property and Environmental Law
at Yale University. She has degrees from Antioch College, B.A. 1962; the University of Chicago, M.A. 1963; Cornell University, Ph.D. 1969; and the University of Chicago Law School,
J.D. 1977.
1. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION 19401975 (1977).
2. See James E. Krier, The End of the World News, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 851 (1994).
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another issue: We need to think about persuasion and rhetoric in dealing
with environmental matters.
I.

THE INFORMATION PROBLEM: SEEING THE ISSUES

One very useful intellectual device for discussing environmental issues has developed over the last generation: Social and economic thinkers have framed these issues as instances of the more generalized problem
of the "commons." According to the now-conventional wisdom, the collective course should be to conserve or invest in common resources. Unfortunately, because of shared or open access, individuals cannot reap all
the benefits of their own forbearance or investment, and hence may be
motivated simply to grab before others do, sometimes with disastrous
results This motivation may affect even public-spirited individuals who
fear that their personal restraint or contribution may go for naught, or
worse, may only enrich the greedy and self-serving. This now-familiar
tale can be told about the pollution of the oceans or the air mantle, the
overhunting of wildlife stocks and underfunding of habitat, the pumping
or poisoning of underground water sources-all cases where unowned or
collective resources are subject to overuse and underinvestment.
Economics, of course, has an interest in such matters, as it does in
all issues of scarce resources. Generally speaking, the greatest social well
being should incorporate collective as well as individually owned goods.
Even if one thinks that individual ownership generally enhances care for
resources, one might call for "privatizing" the good things previously
used or enjoyed in common, but it will not do to pretend that they were
not good things in the first place.
The commons approach to environmental problems has thus assisted us in the simple first step of recognition: We can see that environmental problems really are problems, in the prosaic sense that overuse of
environmental commons can decrease overall social well-being. Despite
the massive uncertainties about environmental questions, we have a good
guess that auto exhaust fumes increase the chances of heart attacks; that
acid rain kills trees and fish; that overforesting aggravates flooding; that
fugitive refrigerant gases, floating high into the atmosphere, contribute to
the irradiation and resulting damage to organic life in the oceans and on
continents below.
3. H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-PropertyResource: The Fishery,
62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 124 (1954). This idea was popularized by Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 Sc. 1243 (1968).
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If one looks only to the conventional theory of the commons, one
can easily grow pessimistic about solving vast and multilayered ecological problems like these. But after a generation of concern with commons
issues, we have also learned that whatever the difficulties in principle,
people in practice sometimes do manage to cope with collective resources, so that the "inexorable" logic of commons does not always play
out so inexorably after all. 4 Left to their own devices, people can figure
out ways to preserve fishing grounds and wild animal stocks; they can
organize and operate collective irrigation systems; and indeed as our own
legislation suggests, they can make some inroads on the polluted commons in air and water, even if the successes have been costly and limited.
Unfortunately, however, we have also learned that despite our tentative grip on some large environmental problems, we really do not deal
very well at all with vast numbers of others. The commons analysis suggests a reason why this is so, though the reason is only indirectly tied to
the self-interest that supposedly induces people to trash the commons.
The trouble is rather a derivative one: People have too few reasons even
to notice commons problems.
Self-interest clearly does play a role here. For example, I easily observe how much more my new car costs because of the pollution control
device that has been installed in it, but I am not likely to focus so sharply
on my own and others' marginally improved chances of avoiding smoginduced respiratory ailments. Similarly, I quickly notice an increase in
my electricity bill, but I have less pointed reason to contemplate how the
utility's new pollution control expenditures may save trees and fish someplace far away. When we mix these weak informational motivations with
the tremendous uncertainties of remote causation (Will carbon dioxide
warm the oceans and threaten shorelands with inundation, or will additional clouds recool the surface?), the problem of simply learning about
environmental problems seems overwhelming. This becomes increasingly so as we find ever remoter and ever vaster commons in the interactions of resources.5
4. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (citing sources); THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS: THE CULTURE AND ECOLOGY OF COMMUNAL RESOURCES (Bonnie J. McCay &

James M. Acheson eds., 1987) (containing essays addressing theory of tragedy of commons);
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHl. L. REV. 711 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Winds Sweep African Soil to Feed Lands Far Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at Al (reporting that dust from Africa nourishes Atlantic biota and
South American rain forest).
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In a sense, what we have learned about self-interest and the commons is not that people necessarily act selfishly in using common resources. Instead we have learned, among other things, that self-interest
is a signalling or attention-getting device of great power. For instance,
regardless of how you eventually act, when you are trying to decide
whether to reroof your own or even a friend's or relative's house, you are
apt to make at least a rough calculation of the costs and benefits and
possible side effects. Unfortunately, environmental problems do not
come packaged with any signalling systems as powerful as self-interest;
quite aside from the enormous difficulties of collecting information scientifically about, say, airborne toxics, we often lack the motivational spur
even to make the effort.
What, then, might focus human attention on common resource
problems? Well, one thing is drama. But what makes things dramatic?
I will return to this subject, but preliminarily, it seems that drama appears sometimes simply by accident, when events speak to what seem to
be widely shared human emotions. On this point, some psychologists
have noted that people exhibit a preference for status quo outcomes and a
special aversion to losses.6 Furthermore, some have identified a set of
factors called "dread" that make a loss or change seem especially bad.7
Among the factors of dread are the sense of large, remote, and sometimes
suddenly erupting forces that cause large-scale havoc and lingering pain
to some identifiable group of innocents. The accidental chemical leak at
Bhopal is a textbook example of loss aversion compounded by dread factors. It was followed, as even nonpsychologists might have predicted,
with its own rush of legislative responses.8
When accidental events create such drama, they no doubt contribute
to the herky-jerky character of our environmental legislation. But another way of creating drama is not so accidental: It is conscious talk.
That is, speakers and actors can frame issues in ways that people will
take notice; they implicitly recognize that people notice certain kinds of
outcomes more readily than others.9 Environmentalists have certainly
taken this cue, and often use disaster imagery in the furtherance of a
variety of causes, just as they use appeals to so-called charismatic animals to dramatize conservation efforts. I do not believe that it is wise to
6. See Daniel Kabneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277-80 (1979).

7. See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 Sci. 280, 280 (1987).
8. See, eg., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1988).
9. For the implications for politicians, see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 772-77 (1990).
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be too critical of this kind of imagery. After all, it does call people's
attention to important matters when ordinary self-interest might not. In
any event, environmentalists are not the only ones to use talk; advertisers
are in this business too, and appeal to environmental consumers with
references to their own green-ness.
Aside from dramatic accidents and image making, what else catches
people's attention? Psychological studies observe several revealing characteristics in the ways that people think about probabilities. Some psychologists use the terms "anchoring," "representativeness," or
"availability" to describe aspects of people's tendency to guess probabilities as if the events in question were similar to other events, particularly
those that are easily accessible in their own thought processes or prior
experiences. 0 Along these lines, some environmental talk appeals to
popularly accessible thought patterns, making issues "salient" ' by coupling them with already "available" ideas. The burgeoning discussion of
environmental rights, such as animal rights or ecosystem rights, carries a
familiar concept into unfamiliar territory, and thus lends a kind of
mental mooring to the issues, especially in a culture like ours where
rights talk bears considerable freight. 2
Another referential coupling appears in the newly emerging topic of
environmental racism, now discussed particularly in connection with the
location of toxic or other wastes in low-income areas.13 Although many
of the specific issues have a familiar ring, since the siting of unwanted
land uses in low income areas is a pattern with a long and shameful history, the language of environmental racism may have helped to alert the
residents of these areas that environmental problems are their problems
too, and not just the musings of wealthy bird watchers. Moreover, this
rhetorical coupling links environmental issues to our most serious historic social problems, thus highlighting for the wealthy bird watchers an
underemphasized dimension of pollution.
I do not mean to suggest that these devices are complete antidotes to
the Information Problem of environmental issues. Indeed, in responding
10. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1124 (1974). This literature is summarized in Noll & Krier, supra note
9, at 752-55.
11. Noll & Krier, supra note 9, at 767, 769.
12. See, eg., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1989). For the import of rights rhetoric, see Carol M. Rose, Environ-

mental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other
Name Is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631 (1989) (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY
OF THE EARTH (1988)).
13. For a summary, see Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning
Approach to Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495 (1992).
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to dramatic gestures or salient linkages, we could be embarking on just
another set of herky-jerky routines, overlooking nuances of comparative
advantage, or disguising from ourselves some causal factors that might
be revealed by more patient inquiry. 4 But one positive aspect of these
appeals is that they may push the research-the information-seeking effort-in directions that would have been ignored otherwise. As I argue
later in this Essay, all these rhetorical devices deserve very serious
consideration.
Interestingly enough, our laws reflect a growing sophistication about
the problem of motivating environmental information gathering.1 5 Environmental impact review for major federal projects was an early move in
this direction. The federal law and related state laws operate by making
a simple direct command to a project-proposing agency: Collect information! This begs other critical questions: Information about what?
And, under what circumstances? In practice, of course, opponents of
particular projects have used these statutes on occasion simply to delay
offending projects, thus making them more costly and problematic.1 6
In one sense, the impact-review statutes did recognize something
important quite early in the modem environmental movement: They implicitly recognized that weak self-interest may result in only weak information. After all, why collect data on bird habitat when you do not have
to pay for its loss? You might collect the data anyway, of course, but
your shareholders or constituents generally will be just as happy if you
do not, since this only adds to your costs. In short, there is no systematic
motivation for you or others to collect data about inputs from or outputs
to the unowned commons. The National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) and its state clones were created in an effort, however clumsy, to
counterbalance that lack of information-gathering motivation.
The command and control statutes of early environmental legislation can be seen as further steps in the legal quest to motivate information gathering. The explicit hope of technology-forcing legislation was
not simply that it would reduce pollution, but also that it would induce
industrialists to undertake research that would lead to more environmentally benign technology. One notable hope was that new types of automobile engines would result from legislation that punished the lack of
14. For a classic example, see KRIER & URSIN, supra note 1, at 52-54 (describing Los
Angeles officials' targeting of one synthetic rubber plant as chief cause of 1943 smog episode).
15. Cf James E. Krier & W. David Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost
and the Form of GovernmentIntervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89, 96-97 (1973) (proposing
that government intervention evolves in direction of saving information costs).
16. See, e.g., Milner S. Ball, Good Old American Permits: Madisonian Federalism on the
TerritorialSea and ContinentalShelf, 12 ENVTL. L. 623, 645 n.68 (1982).
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best available technology, where the phrase included technology that
might be ready in the middle-term future. 7
Critics have long berated technology forcing for its costs, inflexibility, and general futility, and have instead proposed a turn from the stick
of mandatory technology to the carrot of economic incentives. 8 This
has implications for information, because if environmental problems can
be framed in ways that better jog self-interest, then knowledge will be
jogged along with the economic incentives to improve.
The hopes for incentive approaches are particularly noticeable in
two areas: "proto property" rights in pollution control and "shadow
pricing" in cost-benefit analysis. A major experiment in proto property
appears in the acid rain provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act,1 9 which
create a limited regime of tradeable emission rights. A similar approach
was used even earlier in the experiments of the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) with the bubble concept-that is, the permission of
plantwide emissions offsetting to reduce total emissions at lower costs.2 °
Such schemes should make each polluter regard its small measure of pollution as a bounded entitlement, and induce each one to figure out how
to stay within the boundaries, or alternatively, bargain with others for
some portion of their entitlements. As with more conventional forms of
property, tradeable pollution entitlements should give entitlement holders and entitlement purchasers an interest in holding costs down. This,
in turn, should provide an interest in finding cheap, effective pollution
control methods that would presumably alleviate overall pollution.
This is not to imply that property approaches fully satisfy our pollution control needs; they too have garnered some hefty criticism.2 1 Proponents of entitlement schemes are often optimistic about administrative
savings. But in fact, property regimes may be expensive, particularly
where the entitlements are difficult to monitor and police, such as those
involving air emissions.22 It is no accident that most of the entitlement
17. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 626, 634-35 (D.C. Cir.
1973); see also Edison Elec. Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding that
Congress hoped to force innovation by standards set higher than existing technology).
18. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, ControllingEnvironmental Risks through Economic In-

centives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1988).

19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (Supp. III 1991).
20. See Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standardsand "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985).

22. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategiesfor
Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 12-24. Even proponents recognize monitoring costs.

See Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 377-78 (1989).

1030

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:1023

approaches to date have been applied to pollution from large, fixed, industrial sources. No one is seriously suggesting, for example, that automobile drivers receive individualized tradeable pollution entitlements,
even though some crude surrogates have indeed been discussed, such as
taxing gasoline or purchasing and destroying old, heavily polluting
cars.

23

Quite aside from the administrative objections to entitlements regimes, however, some people sense that these stratagems carry a moral
cost of very substantial dimensions. Property rights proponents sometimes seem to assume that only the total pollution matters, and are less
attentive to local concentrations, even though ordinary people may be
very sensitive to the equity of such "hotspots. ' '21 More subtly, the older
command and control approach required each polluter to do its very best
to contain pollution-indeed, better than its best, insofar as best available
pollution control technology included as-yet uninvented devices. The
property rights approaches, on the other hand, seem subject to the complaint that polluters need not do their best at all-they can perpetrate a
wrong if they simply purchase the right to do so. The moral message
strikes some as repugnant and counterproductive, 25 a point to which this
Essay will return shortly.
In a different effort to enlist the self-interest of polluters, some economists have devised ways to derive shadow prices or "contingent values"
to assess the nonmarket values of environmental resources-the value of
their availability for future use, or for the pleasure that they convey by
simply being there, for example. 26 Shadow pricing appears in cost-benefit calculations at the regulatory stage, as well as in the ex post assessments of damage to natural resources in oil spills and other instances of
unplanned pollution releases.
One of the attractions of shadow pricing is its hard quality, which
makes environmental issues seem really to count for something-in a
23. For such a surrogate, see Chicago's "Cashfor Clunkers" ProgramBoost for Air Quality, Governor Claims, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 643, 643 (Aug. 13, 1993). Gas tax schemes are, of
course, related to consumption of gasoline, but not directly to emission of pollutants.
24. See Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law. A Normative Critique of
ComparativeRisk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 592-97 (1992). Complaints about locational effects have already surfaced with respect to acid rain entitlement trades. See E. Margaret Kriz, Emission Control, 1993 NAT'L J., at 1696, 1700.
25. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Clinton Hopes to Clean Up by Buying, Selling Right to Pollute,
L.A. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 1993, at A5; Dan Tracy, OUC [Orlando Utility Commission]Sees Pollution Rights as Gold Mine, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIm., Apr. 7, 1993, at Al (noting critics'
description of emission rights trades as immoral and perverse).
26. On "contingent valuation" for "option" and "existence" values, see Ohio v. United
States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 475-78 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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way, linking environmentalism to the market-oriented thought patterns
so familiar in a larger commercial culture. Moreover, shadow pricing
has the general advantage of quantification, insofar as shadow prices let
people compare some environmental values to others, or compare environmental goods to more individualized ones. Perhaps most important,
these assessments may jog the imagination, and may encourage people to
pay attention to the otherwise ignored losses that they suffer from damage to common resources.
Unfortunately, shadow prices have some disadvantages too. One is
precisely their seemingly hard numerical quality, which may mask their
widely varying presuppositions.2" Moreover, these metaphoric "prices"
sometimes seem rather bizarre to interview subjects, who may be either
puzzled when asked how much they would pay to preserve a place they
will never see, or aggravated at the implication that a price can be put on
something too precious to be sold at all. Indeed, shadow prices have
aroused furious denunciations even from very sophisticated commentators, notably Mark Sagoff, who has reacted with rage to what seem to be
the commodifying premises of these studies, without perhaps noticing
their attention-catching metaphoric usefulness.2"
Thus our environmental legislation has clearly exfoliated a whole
series of information-eliciting approaches to the general problem of
learning about the environment. But upon reflection, it is quite daunting
to realize that the very approaches that might be among the most promising-that is, those that enlist self-interest to motivate environmental
information gathering and problem solving-seem to run into serious
moral criticism precisely because they do enlist self-interest. Unfortunately, this serious rhetorical problem mirrors an equally serious rhetorical problem in the area of environmental budgeting.

II.

THE BUDGET PROBLEM: MANAGING RISKS

If we think about environmental problems as variants on commons
problems, it is pretty clear that not all commons problems are the same.
Thomas Schelling pointed out several years ago that in some-but not
all-of these problems, the slightest damage ruins the whole. In his example, the cutesy roadside sign "every litter bit hurts" is misleading. In27. For this critique in the general context of cost-benefit analysis, see Daniel A. Farber,
Revitalizing Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278, 1282-85 (1993) (reviewing SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN
REGULATORY STATE (1992)).

28. MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 83-92 (1988). But see Rose, supra
note 12, at 1645-46.
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stead, the first scrap offends the most in a pristine area, just as the first
lawn mower disrupts a quiet Sunday morning, no matter how many
others follow.29 In such cases, there is an argument for all-or-nothing
solutions: no snowmobiles in the park, no powerboats in the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area, no trash fires in the backyard.
But pollution problems often have a different pattern, where many
"litter bits" can occur before it matters. Just as your body readily manages small amounts of the same iodine that would poison you in larger
volumes, so can many water bodies absorb a modicum of certain pollutants without any noticeable damage. Similarly, some wild animal stocks
thrive even though, or perhaps because, they are subject to some predation. All-or-nothing approaches are unwarranted here; unrestrained exploitation would certainly decimate the common resource, but a total
ban would neglect the regenerative qualities of the stock, or the absorptive and self-cleansing capacities of the medium.
There are many examples of resource stocks in which a few "litter
bits" have no noticeably damaging effects. In a more complex variant,
there are many other resource stocks where some activities do cause
damage-but the damage costs are dwarfed by the costs of stopping. At
least as of now, for example, most automobiles add to air pollution, and
as a result of our long love affair with the car, we suffer noticeable health
and aesthetic damage. On the other hand, forcing all cars to a screeching
halt would be incredibly costly, both to the individuals who depend on
them or just enjoy them, and to the larger industries that depend on their
production and use. Pollution costs may be real, but control or forbearance costs are real too, and in vast numbers of environmental areas, a
dominating task has been to weigh the one against the other. That is the
first part of the budgeting problem: locating and providing for what has
been called optimal pollution.30
Unfortunately, part-way solutions run counter to much of our legal
tradition. All-or-nothing solutions pervade our tort law, or at least they
did prior to modern ideas of comparative fault. Winner-take-all is the
preference in American electoral law too. And all-or-nothing solutions,
or slight variations on them, have dominated much of our environmental
law as well, particularly in the early stages.
Indeed, it has taken some time to learn that all-or-nothing approaches can be quite awkward and costly. The first version of the En29. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 131 (1978).

30. See William J. Baumol & Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Pricesfor Protection of the Environment, in THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENT 53, 58 (Peter Bohm &

Allen V. Kneese eds., 1971).
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dangered Species Act3 1 permitted no disruption of species designated
"endangered, ' 32 and only after the Tellico Dam imbroglio was the Act
modified to permit some post hoe reconsideration. 33 Similarly, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,34 having now
evolved into the modem Clean Water Act (CWA),3 5 called for an end to
the discharge of pollutants into the nation's waters by 1985,36 but this too
has run into hitches. One example is the CWA's regulation of ocean disposal of various organic wastes.3 7 In some places, notably Hawaii, the
surrounding waters are deep and vast; ocean disposal has genuine costs,
but they are relatively minute in comparison to the cost of fully treating
the sewage before discharge. Hawaiian officials have asked for and received many exemptions, but only after some considerable struggles-not
only with the federal government, but also with the state's own irate
citizens.38
On the whole, the courts are not particularly friendly to these partial
solutions. They have been hard on sewage spills in Hawaii, even when it
has appeared that expensive treatment options might yield comparatively
low returns. 39 They have been equally unsympathetic to the EPA's own
efforts to avoid what seem to be particularly high regulatory costs. For
example, in National Resources Defense Council v. Costle,4 the court
torpedoed the EPA's effort to exempt a variety of small feedlots from
water pollution controls, giving short shrift to the argument that the
small operations presented relatively high enforcement expenses. Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,4 1 the court required the EPA to
issue regulations on radionuclide emissions. The court held that once the
emissions were listed among toxic air pollutants, the EPA had an affirmative duty to regulate,4 2 and brushed aside the EPA's plea that it was
31. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
32. § 9, 87 Stat. at 893-95.
33. Refer to current law at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(g) (1988).
34. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
U.S.C.).
35. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1387 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993).
36. § 101(a)(1), 86 Stat. at 816.
37. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1343.
38. Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368 (D.Haw. 1993).
39. See id. at 1395-96 (disparaging city's dilution strategy, yet mitigating civil penalties
since no measurable harm shown).
40. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
41. 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984). For more recent developments, see Natural Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 976 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1992).
42. Sierra Club, 602 F. Supp. at 894-95.
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impossible to regulate these intractable materials. 43 In Chemical ManufacturersAss'n v. EPA,' a private party attempted to avoid regulation by
presenting an explicit cost-calculation theory: Regulatory expenditures
should only extend to the "knee-of-the-curve," the point at which additional and more thoroughgoing controls face steeply rising marginal
costs. 45 The argument fell on deaf ears.
In these and other judicial opinions, the courts often claim to be
following the logic of Congress's legislation, and to a considerable degree
they are. But some environmental laws suggest that. regulators should
not pursue pollutants on an all-out basis, but only somewhat beyond a
margin where it seems to be worth the effort; much legislation requires
not outright bans on dangerous substances, but only controls that assure
"an adequate margin of safety." This language recognizes some limit on
the effort to eradicate harmful materials, and hence embraces some partial solutions. To be sure, of course, this language cannot be read as a
full commitment to optimizing, which would justify an earlier spending
cutoff at that knee-of-the-curve where additional control expenditures
rise rapidly without proportional benefits.
Critics like Barry Commoner argue that even the "margin of safety"
route is misguided, and that we are wasting our time and resources when
we adopt partial solutions. Better to abandon these unsuccessful halfway
accommodations to problems, he argues, and to turn toward eliminating
pollutants at the source.4 6 On his prescription, we should reduce pollution not to some more or less acceptable level, but to zero.4 7
Why have all-or-nothing solutions seemed so attractive, and half-aloaf solutions so difficult to devise and defend? For one thing, people
may have only a dim intuitive grasp of the benefits from partial measures.4" For another, these measures are likely to be organizationally and
politically complex. Optimal pollution requires us to select allowable
levels of pollution and determine the triggers for regulatory activity, all
of which invite fervid lobbying-and even more so when the choices shift
with experience and technological change. Thus, for example, it might
make sense to permit more contact even with something as toxic as di43. Id. at 899.
44. 870 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 910 (1990).
45. Id. at 205.
46. Barry Commoner, Failure of the Environmental Effort, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,195 (June 1988).
47. Id. at 10,196-98; see Charles Alpert, A Fresh Start for Environmental Regulation, 24
Env't Rep. (BNA) 923, 923 (Oct. 24, 1993).
48. Similar is the tendency to underspend on probabilistic insurance, which reduces without eliminating the possibility of loss. See Noll & Krier, supra note 9, at 758-59.
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oxin if we learn that this substance is not so dangerous as we once
thought; or conversely, it may make sense to ratchet down the allowable
amounts if new control technologies make restraint cheaper. Either way,
we can predict that changes in permissible levels will generate innumerable headaches and resistance as well as figures and counterfigures from
conflicting interests.49 By comparison, all-or-nothing approaches-let it
go or ban it entirely-look attractively simple when intermediate choices
face wrangles, as they always do on environmental questions, given the
fuzziness of our information about them.
And of course, monitoring is apt to be easier with all-or-nothing
approaches than with partial ones. Alcohol regulators reduce their policing costs by barring liquor sales to those under eighteen, even though
many young people would doubtless drink prudently. A ban on a given
pesticide may mean boarding up the manufacturing plant; but a rationed
solution, or the requirement of particular application technologies, requires the monitoring of many more persons, locations, and activities.
Small wonder, then, that commentators like Commoner despair of partial solutions and opt for banning instead of rationing.
But quite aside from these conventional problems of administrative
feasibility, experience suggests that partial solutions raise substantial
moral issues. At the most primitive level, the very materials of environmental degradation often strike us as repellent, revolting, and frightening. Oil slicks and sewage sludge seem loathsome in themselves. The
common disgust at these contaminants impedes our coolly weighing the
possibility of, say, simply closing the beaches a few times a year, rather
than requiring better-built ships or demanding the installation of leakproof sewage treatment equipment, which would obviate these unpleasant events altogether. Is it cheaper to close the beaches occasionally?
Arguably, yes; but this solution may be viscerally unacceptable.
At a considerably more sophisticated level is the ethical approach
linked to a Kantian categorical imperative, according to which one
should be able to universalize the moral principles upon which one acts.
This certainly is not a prescription for partial solutions, whereby a little
bit of a bad is accepted. Insofar as a Kantian ethic captures moral intuitions, it suggests that partial solutions may run into moral quagmires.
As Commoner puts it, partial solutions allow the pollution perpetrators
49. For impediments to changing resource management regimes, see GARY D. LIBECAP,
19-28 (James Alt & Douglas North eds., 1989). Dioxin is an example; for pros and cons on its dangerousness, see Jeff Bailey, How Two Industries
Created a Fresh Spin on the Dioxin Debate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1992, at Al.
CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
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to set the baseline, and encourage meekness about a situation whose ill
effects he says are likely to be felt most by the poor."
Indeed, distributional issues may especially compound Kantian
qualms when partial solutions take the form of tradeable, property-like
entitlements. Not only are emission or effluent entitlements part-way approaches-since they contemplate some modicum of continuing pollution-but the entitlements themselves are unevenly distributed.
Tradeable emission or effluent rights, however dear to the economic approach towards environmental budgeting, look rather like a dispensation
from good behavior sometimes, enjoyed only by some people, namely
those who pay for the privilege. Needless to say, Kantian or cryptoKantian intuitions may find such solutions offensive."1
Summing up the Budget Problem, then, when we compare the gains
from environmental protections to their costs, it seems clear that we
sometimes need some level of optimal pollution or optimal resource use.
This is because at some marginal point, an extra measure of control will
bring only diminishing returns in protection. Beyond this point, we
waste resources by devoting more to pollution control.
But optimal pollution may be politically and administratively
costly-a concern even for cost-benefit calculators. Perhaps more important, optimal pollution also may seem morally costly. Indeed, the very
concept runs the risk of undermining the civility and mutual forbearance
that quietly underlie so much of our practical environmental conservation.52 It is hard to see a little bit of pollution as the right thing to do. It
is even harder to see it as the right thing for some people to do, simply
because they can afford it. Moreover, regimes permitting such pollutionfor-pay pose the threat of making citizens callous about polluting in general. Thus in the Budget Problem as in the Information Problem, moral
objections seem strongest against just those approaches-the partial solutions and property-rights methods-that would otherwise appear to be
particularly promising in environmental management. Unfortunately,
the same depressing scenario appears when we try to prioritize risks.
50. Commoner, supra note 46, at 10,198; BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE
42-43, 59-60 (1990).
51. For moralism of "everyday Kantianism," see JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY

PLANET

192-95 (1989).
52. See Thomas C. Schelling, Pricesas Regulatory Instruments, in
RONMENTAL PROTECTION

1, 4-5 (Thomas C. Schelling ed., 1983).
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THE PRIORITIES PROBLEM: RANKING THE

IsSUES

I have used the Budget Problem as the label for a difficult, but relatively narrow, set of issues-that is, weighing the net benefits of some
particular extractive or polluting activity, and balancing those against the
benefits that we would enjoy if we alleviated the degradation of the same
environmental resource. The Budget Problem, so defined, is about comparing particular resource risks to particular control costs.
An extended version of the Budget Problem is what I am calling the
Priorities Problem, which raises budgetary concerns in a more global
context. The Priorities Problem revolves about comparative risks:
Should we turn first to Environmental Danger Number 1 (ED-1) or to
Environmental Danger Number 2 (ED-2)? To answer that, we need to
weigh the costs and benefits of controlling ED-1, at any given level,
against the costs and benefits of controlling ED-2.
Looked at in this broader context, the Priorities Problem presumes
that not all resources are equally valuable, not all risks are equally risky,
and not all costs are equally costly. Moreover, even if ED-1 is our most
serious risk at the outset, at some level of expenditure we would do better
to shift our layouts to control ED-2; and similarly, later on, to ED-3 and
so on. This, in very simplified form, is the idea that Richard Stewart has
outlined as a "risk portfolio approach," where the goal is to achieve what
military planners used to call "the Biggest Bang for the Buck"-the
greatest level of risk protection, given the budget available for the whole
array of environmental risks that confront us.53
In view of the need to use our resources in the most prudent way,
risk portfolio approaches seem to make obvious sense. This is something
else we have learned over a generation of environmental law, and the
lesson is reflected in the comparative risk approaches that now influence
so much of the EPA's thinking.5 4 Indeed, a quite remarkable set of New
York Times articles in the Spring of 1993 suggested that comparative risk
approaches have seeped into the popular consciousness as well. Even
Jane and John Doe now are starting to believe that we should concentrate on the big environmental issues first; if necessary even letting the
little things ride for a while.
53.
(Envtl.
54.
55.

Richard B. Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 Envtl. L. Rep.
L. Inst.) 10,208 (Aug. 1986).
For an interesting analysis, see Hornstein, supra note 24.
Keith Schneider, New View CallsEnvironmental Policy Misguided, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.

21, 1993, at Al; Michael Spector, Sea-Dumping Ban: Good Politics, but Not Necessarily Good
Policy, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 22, 1993, at Al; Joel Brinkley, Many Say Lab-Animal Tests Fail to
Measure Human Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at Al; Keith Schneider, How Rebellion
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But a risk portfolio approach only magnifies the obstacles encountered in the Budget Problem, and adds a few besides. Most important is
the question of assessing comparative costs and benefits. If these are difficult to calculate in the context of one single pollutant, they are exponentially more difficult where the control of each pollutant has to be weighed
against the control of the other pollutants in the entire portfolio full of
risks.
Then too, there are all the issues plaguing partial solutions. Comparative risk assessment drags in a whole portfolio full of these part-way
solutions, and administrative and political obstacles are bound to multiply in this broad arena. Moreover, because comparative approaches pick
and choose across a whole spectrum of risks, they may cluster the distribution of environmental burdens, and in so doing may raise particularly
difficult equitable questions. That is, with a comparative risk approach,
the issue is not simply that some air pollution controls may be halted
before easing the discomfort of the most sensitive asthmatics. Rather, all
the asthmatics' breathing problems might be disregarded, at least temporarily, while resources are concentrated instead on some other risk altogether, such as a waterborn pollutant linked to birth defects. The logic of
comparative risk speaks clearly for dealing first with the most serious,
most widespread, and most easily controlled harms; however, that logic
creates "hotspots"-or rather, cold comfort for the asthmatics.
Once again, tradeable pollution entitlements seem especially vulnerable to such distributional complaints. For example, it has been suggested that toxins be ranked, and that control over more serious toxic
materials might be exchanged for continued production of less toxic
ones.5 6 That is, producers of ED-17 may continue to produce, if they
clean up some portion of ED-3, on the theory that the expenditure on
ED-3 will prevent more overall harm. But the nagging distributional
question of these trades is obvious: What then happens to those populations particularly affected by the generally less damaging Environmental
Danger Number 17?
Indeed, in principle, a risk portfolio approach should weigh the relative costs and benefits of all regulatory efforts; thus, in effect, we should
be talking about an "Unhappiness Portfolio." In that sense, an environmental risk portfolio is itself a part-way approach writ large, since socalled environmental risks only constitute one slice of the array of risks
over Environmental Rules Grew from a Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16;

Keith Schneider, Second Chance on Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1993, at A17.
56. See Catherine Cooney, State Air Regulators Question Legality of EPA Toxics Plan,
ENV'T WK., Nov. 5, 1992, at 3.
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existing in the world. Small wonder, then, that all the problems of partway solutions rise exponentially when risks are compared.
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that comparative risk approaches
have had faint resonance in the courts, where equitable considerations
are never far in the background. I have already mentioned some instances in which the courts have disrupted partial solutions.5 7 Now, consider this hostility in the arena of comparative risks. If, with respect to a
single risk, an agency is forbidden from taking into account the marginally increasing costs of pursuing diminishing dangers, then by extension
and a fortiori, it would seem that the same agency would be required to
ignore the point that on average we would be better off if, after the control costs of ED-1 (say, smog precursors) started to rise very rapidly, the
agency turned its attention instead to ED-2 (say, construction runoff),
not to speak of ED-3 or ED-100.
Courts have a particular problem with such global approaches: As
an institutional matter, they see problems one at a time. When judges
say that the EPA has to go the regulatory whole hog once it has declared
radionuclides a danger, they have no information about other potentially
regulatable risks that are claimants on the regulatory budget. Furthermore, even if they did have such information, they might not be able to
predict whether the EPA would expend its budgetary savings on the next
risk in line.
But of course it is hard for anyone to see risks in a global context.
That too is one of the reasons for our herky-jerky legislation-our Love
Canal legislation (CERCLA),5 8 our Bhopal legislation (EPCTRA),"9 our
Exxon Valdez legislation (Oil Pollution Act)6 ° and so on. The courts are
not the only ones to see things one at a time. Indeed, the judicial decisions on environmental regulation only highlight a more widespread
point about global approaches to risks: Once an evil is known, it becomes salient, and it crowds out other possibilities in the risk portfolio.
Courts have their own rules for salience, but for the rest of us, the simple
identification of a problem makes it more salient than other matters that
remain undisclosed. It seems more important to follow through on controlling the known risk than the unknown, at least in part because we are
often not comparing the known risk to anything else at all.
Hence the Priorities Problem-which is in a way only a globalized
version of the Budget Problem-circles back around to the Information
57. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).

60. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. IV 1992).
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Problem, and to the difficulty of simply noticing environmental issues.
Indeed, in a sense, the very notion of prioritizing risks suggests that we
have already solved the Information Problem-that we already know the
range of risks "out there," and which risks are more dangerous than
others. Distressingly often, however, we do not have a firm grasp on that
information at all, and even when we do in principle, the dramatic and
already known things get noticed, the not-known and not-present risks
remain beneath the surface, precluding any genuine comparison. The
result, as the "loss aversion" psychologists point out, is that we may hate
risks that threaten the things we now have, but are comparatively complacent about risks that threaten things we can only contemplate. Moreover, even when we are aware of comparative risks, the comparisons
themselves do not carry much intuitive meaning, particularly in the context of very large or very small numbers. Who really grasps the difference between one-in-a-billion and one-in-a-trillion risk? What is a
trillion, anyway? The psychologists suggest that while human beings can
talk the talk, the numbers do not mean much.6"
Thus it may well be that a risk portfolio strategy is a useful approach to environmental regulation, but legal institutions do not easily
take a synoptic and comparative view. Instead, particular and individual
questions crowd out the big picture-and the most salient and dramatic
questions have the biggest elbows.
And so, once again, one of our most promising approaches, a risk
portfolio strategy, seems to face the greatest obstacles from the very intuitions we rely on to tell us what is important, appropriate, and normatively acceptable. Moreover, we have only a dim and quavering picture
of what a risk portfolio would look like-but what we see looks administratively difficult and morally hard-hearted.
IV.

ENVIRONMENT AND RHETORIC

Are there ways out of these related dilemmas-that is, that the most
promising efforts to learn about, and act upon, environmental risks seem

to elicit only threadbare comprehension and stubborn normative
resistance?
One response is to look to institutions. Bruce Ackerman and William Hassler have suggested that such problems are precisely why we
need a kind of New Deal agency to manage environmental questions-an
agency with wide latitude and with only light policing by Congress and
61. Chauncey Starr & Chris Whipple, Risks of Risk Decisions, in RISK IN THE TECHNO-

LOGICAL SOCIETY 217, 227-29 (Christoph Hohenemser & Jeanne X. Kasperson eds., 1982).
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the courts.6 2 Such a superagency, the argument goes, is the only institutional chance we have to deal comprehensively- with specific environmental questions on some basis other than sheer accident or theatricality.6"
Something akin to the superagency idea has been around for some
time. William Ophuls, extrapolating from Garrett Hardin's work, gave
an early and pessimistic assessment of such an agency by calling it a
Hobbesian solution-a Leviathan in the form of an expert elite, necessitated by the general intractability of environmental issues to popular
democratic choice.64 Even with a Leviathan, of course, one might question how well agency experts manage environmental problems. For one
thing, they too seem prone to the errors of statistical judgment that
plague the rest of us. 65 For another, there is the question of accountability. Too much accountability makes the administrators simply second
66
guess the elected branches, whatever the effects on the environment;
too little accountability, if the dismal environmental example of the former Soviet bloc is any guide, makes them careless to the point of
recklessness.
Indeed, a second response to this set of environmental dilemmas is
simply pessimism. James Krier, for example, who among environmental
scholars has taken an early and penetrating interest in the cognitive
blocks to environmental understanding, 67 often writes in a deep vein of
melancholy.68
Nevertheless, our stock of intellectual traditions may have some
supplies that we might well peruse more carefully. How does one engage
the attention of persons who are otherwise uninterested? How does one
change people's minds about the ways they should behave, individually
or as members of larger communities? Accidental events can do these
things, of course; but these matters are not always left to chance. Whole
fields of study like theater, literature, art, and rhetoric, are devoted to
such questions, even if these studies tend to be overlooked in much environmental scholarship.
62. Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean
Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466 (1980).
63. Id. at 1471-74.
64. WILLIAM OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 147-63 (1977).
65. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10, at 1125-26 (noting that "experienced research psychologists" made common statistical errors).
66. See Delaney v. EPA, 898 F.2d 687, 690 (9th Cir.) (discussing EPA's argument that
history of extensions showed that Congress did not actually intend clean air deadlines in statute to be draconian), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990).
67. See Noll & Krier, supra note 9.
68. See, e.g., Krier, supra note 2; James E. Krier & Clayton P. Gillette, The Un-Easy Case
for TechnologicalOptimism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 405 (1985).
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It is quite astonishing to see how strongly environmentalism has
been influenced by aesthetic presentations-even though the literature of
environmental policy pays relatively little attention. Ansel Adams took
photos; Aldo Leopold, Edward Abbey, and John Muir told stories and
wrote essays. All these people have played a considerable hand in convincing others of the value and wonder of the unowned commons of our
environment. In Germany, the novels of Karl May, a writer almost unknown in the United States, have had an immense effect in shaping that
country's popular understandings of the American West. By the same
token, there is a good reason why photography looms so large in the
environmental journals, like Sierra or the Audobon Magazine. Sometimes, following in the tradition of Ansel Adams, they use photographs
of breathtaking beauty; sometimes they use pictures of heartbreaking despoliation. As was mentioned earlier, advertisers too are aware that aesthetic sensibilities have persuasive power; hence the vivid photography of
"green advertising." Public broadcasting plays its part as well, with its
extensive television narrations about animals and wild places.
With aesthetics and rhetoric in mind, we might reconsider the Information, Budget, and Priorities Problems, and think afresh whether a
moral cloud need necessarily shadow some of the approaches that otherwise seem so promising. I argued earlier that property-rights approaches
might be among the most promising with respect to the Information
Problem, because property rights so often induce people to collect and
weigh information carefully. Unfortunately, property has a long-standing image problem, suffering from a sometimes extraordinarily vivid association with the vices of greed and avarice. 69YeYet property also
resonates to a much more positive rhetoric-that of thrift, care, and attention to the needs of potential trading partners in what Enlightenment
thinkers called gentle commerce.70 Indeed the rhetoric of stewardship
and trusteeship, so commonly used in environmental discussions, are derived from property arrangements. 71 The stratagems of tradeable emission or effluent rights might well be more appealing if they were to draw
on these latter traditions, and if they noted the association of property
with the careful husbanding of resources, as well as responsibility to
others. Some people worry that property-like devices permit the rich to
69. Medieval artists, for example, sometimes depicted avarice as an ape defecating money.

See Lester K. Little, Pride Goes before Avarice: Social Change and the Vices in Latin Christendom, 76 AM. HIST. REv. 16, 37-38, 44 (1971).
70. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 59-63 (1977).

71. See Carol M. Rose, Given-ness and Gift: Property and the Quest for Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1, 25-27 (1994).
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perpetrate evils. But another way to think about this, as some economists already stress, is that those who use environmental resources must
pay the costs, just as they must pay for privately held goods. After all, as
environmentalists sometimes observe, the air and waters are property
too-they belong to all of us-and property rhetoric can clarify that
point.72
With respect to the Budget Problem, I argued that partial or moderating approaches are especially important, not only because it is wasteful
to control environmental harms beyond the threshold at which they really are harms, but also because controls themselves tend to increase in
expense as they move from alpha to omega. The commonly used phrase
"optimal pollution" encapsulates a shorthand version of these ideas. But
this phrase itself is a bit of a shocker, perhaps by design, given its mix of
pollution with a word suggesting good. 73 There are other possible
phrases, however, that can imaginatively open up the important and essentially conservationist idea behind partial solutions. "Sustainable development," for example, implies not a hands-off approach but rather a
moderate use of environmental resources that is compatible with their
regeneration. Agriculture is a fountain of gentle language on the subject;
"husbandry" and "shepherding" convey how resources may be used for
a very long time, so long as they are used with attentiveness and care.
Additionally, visual imagery sometimes flags these moderating aspects of
part-way controls. Partial controls over resources often involve quotas,
permitting the use of environmental resources up to some threshold.
Several types of physical objects-a bridge, a beach, or a road-can metaphorically convey the idea that some use can be appropriate, so long as
the use is kept within bounds.
As to the Priorities Problem, I argued that this set of issues loops
back to the Information Problem. To compare risks in a risk portfolio,
people need an intellectual grip on what can be compared. Just as important, people need a sense of what the comparisons actually mean when,
for example, one-in-a-million and one-in-a-trillion risks do not seem that
different-both just seem really, really little.
Here again is where rhetoric and aesthetics may help to expand our
thinking. Consider "little." This is a word about physical size, and when
72. Older legal discussions were quite forthright about this, and talked of vindicating
"public rights" in prohibiting private appropriations of such environmental resources as waterways. See, e.g., Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal
History, 72 CAL. L. REv. 217, 222-24 (1984).
73. For an example of a somewhat pugnacious use of the phrase, see WILLIAM F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS:

THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5-9

(1974).
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we think of a little thing, our visual imagination is likely to be engaged.
One way to get through the common intuitive gap about statistics is to
use pictures creatively. Edward Tufte's book, The Visual Display of
QuantitativeInformation, makes this point very forcefully, and does so
with wonderful illustrations. 74 Furthermore, the visual imagination can
draw comparisons even without actual pictures. Most of us have encountered visual rhetorical devices many times. Take, for a recent example, the explanations telling us that if all the Defense Department's waste
bullets and bombs were put in disposal trucks, the line would stretch
from New York to St. Louis.7 5 Former Congressman Mike McCormack,
who attempted to convey the relative sizes of large numbers (millions,
billions, trillions), asked his audience to imagine beads covering spaces of
varying dimensions, ranging from a jar to a committee room to the State
of Ohio.7 6
Tufte's books on graphics take seriously the visual rhetoric behind
statistical information. So should those of us who think that environmental matters are important. Many of the crucial comparisons are essentially statistical risk comparisons, and if we ordinary citizens and our
legislators are to grasp their meaning and make sensible decisions about
comparative costs and benefits, we must see these statistics in aesthetically comprehensible translations.
Stories give another kind of handle on the Priorities Problem. Scarcity underlies any ranking decision. We cannot have everything, and
that is why we need priorities. One decision-making technique for ranking, in scenarios everywhere from grocery shopping to international
strategy, is to take a kind of mental test, engaging in what are sometimes
called thought experiments. That is, one spins out alternative scenarios
to try out consequences and reactions of different rankings. People engage in these mental exercises almost without thinking about them. For
example, consider last minute Christmas shopping. A person might imagine making several different sequences of trips to get the gifts most
needed, reconsidering along the way which gifts are really most important and capable of being purchased within the short time available.
Larger decisions, such as job moves, also involve such thought experiments. A person actually goes through a move in one's mind to see how
74.

EDWARD TuFTE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION

(1983).

75. Barry Meier, Breaking Down an Arms Buildup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1993, at Dl. For

the importance of comparative imagery in a related context, see Peter H. Schuck, What Do
Patients Want to Know?: Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
76. See Former Congressman's Advice to Lawmakers: Before Writing Laws, Get Your
Numbers Straight, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 101 (May 27, 1988).
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it "feels," and uses the results to decide whether the aspects one thinks
important really are so important after all, and how they stack up against
other aspects of working and living arrangements.
Use of art, stories, and drama raise an obvious objection: the threat
of manipulation. Pictures and stories do carry messages, sometimes in
forms that are not easily noticeable and hence, not easily rebuttable. It
has been observed lately, for example, that those glorious Ansel Adams
photographs are empty of people, as if the indigenous peoples who once
frequented Yosemite had simply melted into thin air, leaving behind an
equally thin understanding of the human relationship to what we fondly
call "natural" areas."
But the problem of manipulation, in a way, points even more toward
learning about these forms of persuasion. If it is true that narrative, art,
and drama can manipulate human beings, then we especially need to take
these matters seriously. Otherwise, we could be pulled this way or that
quite inadvertently, particularly given the difficulty that we have in wrapping our rational thinking around subjects as abstract and distant as environmental issues. Indeed, inattention to aesthetics and rhetoric then
becomes an especially serious mistake. If we fail to pay attention, we
may find our aesthetic responses to environmental events exploited by
advertising ploys and political hucksterism, or buffeted by accidents and
the accompanying journalistic attention-the new Bhopals or the next
pair of stranded whales. Then too, we may find that hard-nosed rationalists ridicule ordinary responses, pointing out the hard costs and benefits
of reacting to such events while neglecting to note that at least some of
these responses might reflect rational patterns of value.78
Thus, simply as citizens, we owe it to ourselves to try to understand,
sort out, and educate such responses in a conscious and reflective fashion.
This, of course, was precisely the effort of the old study of rhetoric,
which goes back to Aristotle and beyond, and which has been described
recently as the way in which discourse may render situations determinate
for purposes of action. 79 Narrative, a subject of some modern interest, is
a close relative to rhetoric. This is not surprising since narrative theory
77. See Rebecca Solnit, Up the River of Mercy, SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 50, 53, 56.
78. See Hornstein, supra note 24, at 614-15. For the rhetoric of economics generally, see
DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985). For the use of scientific
trappings, see id. at 96.
79. Amy H. Kastely, Unification and Community: A RhetoricalAnalysis of the United
Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574, 578 (1988).
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can be related to the theory of action, and especially to the actions of
social communities.'
This is, of course, why it is important to study narrative, rhetoric,
and, also, aesthetics. Aristotle distinguished the persuasive art of rhetoric from the scientific or logical study of dialectic. 8 I The distinction relates to action: People have to deliberate and act in the world on matters
that may not admit of complete intellectual demonstration.8 2 Even
scientists cannot demonstrate everything; they rely to a great extent on
the work of others, resting on the reputation of other scientists. But reputation itself is an important element of rhetoric; as Aristotle discussed at
a matter when stated by a
length, listeners are more inclined to believe
83
person of seeming probity and intelligence.
Parenthetically, this may be an appropriate point to put in a word
for science education as well. Some environmental literature shows a
tendency to array humanistic concerns for justice, empathy, beauty, and
holism on the one side and squinty-eyed, mechanistic, domineering modem science on the other.8 4 But whatever one's view of modem scientific
method may be, it is important to bear in mind that knowledge of natural
things often enhances one's passionate engagement in them. Otherwise,
it would be difficult to understand such a pivotal environmental figure as
Aldo Leopold, who was both a naturalist and a storyteller. Environmental issues call for considerable learning about the natural world, but
learning also clearly has an aesthetic component: Knowing about things,
on the whole, makes those things even more interesting, so that learning
about the natural world can defy the usual declining demand curve and
become a powerful spur to even further inquiry.
Science is important because the most important defense of rhetoric
is that, in Aristotelian terms, rhetoric can most easily impart true opinion on the perhaps optimistic Aristotelian view that human beings incline
to the truth anyway. 5 Modem cognitive psychologists dent this opti86
mism, arguing that opinion-making heuristics lead to systematic error.
Even that point, however, is not so clear. The widespread preference for
voluntary risks over involuntary ones, or for equal burden sharing even
80. Id.; see DAVID CARR, TIME, NARRATIVE AND HISTORY 24, 45-46, 57-65, 149-50
(1986) (relating narrative to theory of action and community).
81. THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 1 (Lane Cooper trans., 1932) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE].
82. Id. at 9-11.
83. Id. at 8, 91-92.
84. For a balanced discussion, see JOSEPH R. DESJARDINS, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 512 (1993).
85. ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 5.
86. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10.
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at some social cost, may not be so much errors as reflections of "hardwired" human desires. Preferences of this sort may even have some
adaptive functions: the taste for equality, for example, may act as a
rough form of insurance. Even the mental flattening of very large or very
small numbers may be a useful form of rational ignorance in many instances where it is enough to know that something is "very large" or
"very tiny." Insofar as these flattenings are remediable by rhetorical or
visual representation, we may not be dealing with systematic cognitive
error at all, but rather with error in the choice of communicative media.
Environmental issues present special difficulties of cognition and attention because of their remoteness, abstractness, and distance from the
ordinary attention-getting features of self-interest. Those are not necessarily reasons for despair. Rather, they are reasons to think about thinking, and about communication, about moral and aesthetic responses, and
about the relations of those responses to the cooperative actions that we
need to deal with common resources. Those are the matters that, among
others, make environmentalism an inquiry not only of great economic
importance, but also of special intellectual excitement.
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